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Comparing Government Performance Indicators:
A Fuzzy-set Analysis*
Phil Kim** and Tobin Im***
Abstract: National governments rely on global performance indicators to 
measure where they stand and to build future strategies. However, no previous 
study has compiled various indices to investigate pathways to government 
performance. We use fuzzy-set analysis to investigate what role each of five 
determinants of government performance—trait competitiveness, change-oriented 
citizenship behavior, public service motivation, organizational identification, 
and corruption tolerance—play in three representative government performance 
indicators—“Government Effectiveness”, “Government Efficiency”, and 
“Throughput”. The results indicate that government performance as measured 
by these three indicators is commonly tied to strongly public-service-motivated 
employees. These three indicators are distinguished from one another with 
regard to the number of factors that contribute to the construction of sufficient 
configurations, the role of innovation-inclined factors, and the role of corruption 
tolerance.
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INTRODUCTION
With the rapid advance of globalization, countries are competing with each 
other more fiercely. In pursuit of greater competitiveness, governments have sought 
to improve their performance. Governments have not only introduced domestic 
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performance management systems inspired by the new public management 
approach but have also begun to rely on international performance comparison. In 
response to a growing interest on the part of governments and researchers in inter-
national comparisons of government performance, many global institutions have 
elaborated various indices to measure government performance. National govern-
ments monitor to fluctuations in their ranking in “Government Effectiveness” 
(Worldwide Governance Indicators), “Government Efficiency” (Global Competi-
tiveness Index; World Competitiveness Rankings), “Throughput” (Government 
Competitiveness Index), and “Quality of Government” (Quality of Governance 
Institute Dataset).
Yet these government performance indicators are based on multiple factors that 
can result in different rankings for the same national government. This is mainly 
due to differences in how “performance” is defined that in turn is tied to different 
understandings of the role of government. The index of government efficiency is 
based on Michael Porter’s diamond model that defines government’s role as “act-
ing as a catalyst and challenger; it is to encourage—or even push—companies to 
raise their aspirations and move to higher levels of competitive performance” (Por-
ter, 1990). Throughput as a driver of government competitiveness, by contrast, is 
described as “the power of government, in light of various constraints, to take 
resources from inside and outside of the country, for the purpose of improving 
social, economic and cultural conditions of the nation aimed at sustainably enhanc-
ing respective citizen’s quality of life” (Ho & Im, 2012). From the standpoint of 
throughput, active engagement in social development is an element of government 
performance while that is not the case for the government efficiency index. 
The construction of government performance indices is an increasingly hotly 
debated topic in academia (Ko & Park, 2012; Cho et al., 2013; Im et al., 2015), but 
there has not yet been an empirical study on the varying emphasis of each indica-
tor. There is a gap in the existing literature regarding how governments can per-
form better and how performance indices can be distinguished from each other. 
Thus, in this paper, we investigate the role of organizational determinants of gov-
ernment performance scores with organizational behavioral factors, which are trait 
competitiveness, change-oriented citizenship behavior, public service motivation, 
organizational identification, and corruption tolerance. These explanatory variables 
are popularly applied measures in the analysis of pathways to organizational per-
formance. Variables are collected from 2017 Government Competitiveness Global 
Survey, and employees’ survey scores are averaged to obtain a score for the coun-
try unit. We chose three-year average scores of government effectiveness, govern-
ment efficiency, and throughput as our dependent variables to compare with one 
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another and fuzzy-set qualitative analysis as a way to determine the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a given outcome. 
We limit our scope of analysis to developing nations, distinguished by OECD 
membership, to set appropriate conditions for comparison among samples. We also 
do not engage with the theoretical arguments on constructs of indices because our 
interest lies in which combination of organizational behavioral factors contribute to 
each performance score. We try to determine each indicator’s own take on the role 
of government by empirically investigating the conditions that are sufficient for a 
country achieving a high performance mark for a given indicator rather than by 
approaching the matter theoretically. 
The remainder of this article is divided into several parts. First, we summarize 
studies on the five determinants of government performance we consider in this 
article. In this part, we discuss the public administrative context of each of these 
constructs and then examine both their positive and negative impact on government 
performance. In the following part, we introduce the data that we derive our vari-
ables from and outline why fuzzy-set qualitative analysis is an appropriate method 
for our study. Finally, we describe the results from the empirical analysis and then 
wrap up by exploring the implications of the different sufficient conditions of the 
indicators that lead to high marks for a given government’s performance.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Government Performance 
Recent attempts to implement administrative reforms and to make managerial 
innovations successful have been mostly related to improving government perfor-
mance (Coggburn & Schneider, 2003). Governments across the world have put per-
formance management systems in place and a considerable amount of research has 
been conducted regarding the factors contributing to strong performance (O’Toole 
& Donaldson, 2000; Ingraham & Donahue, 2000). Despite the vast amount of liter-
ature focusing on public management and its impact on government performance, 
the concept of performance remains nebulous. 
The new public management has focused on developing a performance mea-
surement system like the U.S. Program Assessment Rating Tool. However, as 
Trivedi (2017) has pointed out, even though the performance of a country’s govern-
ment is a key determinant of its competitiveness, it is still an open question how to 
measure performance. Measurement of performance within a country is important, 
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but comparable indicators are also needed to assess the competitiveness of a nation. 
Thus, international indices that intend to measure government performance ought 
to be considered.
There are several international institutions that measure governments’ perfor-
mance at the country level every year. The World Bank, the World Economic 
Forum, the Government Competitiveness Center, the Quality of Government Insti-
tute, the International Institute for Management Development, and the World Jus-
tice Project are the most well-known examples. The World Bank’s Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators describe government effectiveness as perceptions of the quality 
of a government’s public services, the quality of its civil service and the degree of 
its independence from political pressure, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such poli-
cies (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2018). The level of government spending, 
the extent of regulatory burdens, and the degree of transparency in policy making 
are used to measure government efficiency (World Economic Forum, 2018). 
Throughput, an element of David Easton’s system theory, is the combination of 
human capacity and the management capacity of a government that reflects its cur-
rent competitiveness and its potential for growth (Government Competitiveness 
Center, 2018). Quality of government is a subcategory that uses almost 70 indica-
tors to address the question of how to create and maintain high quality government 
institutions (Quality of Government, 2018). The International Institute for Manage-
ment Development publishes the “World Competitiveness Rankings” that gauges a 
country’s capacity to create desirable environment for doing business, using gov-
ernment efficiency as subindicator to measure government performance. The World 
Justice Project measures constraints on government powers and the degree of open-
ness of a government that reflect to what extent a government is ruling by law 
(World Justice Project, 2018). The indices differ from one another in their core 
assumption as to what features make up government performance. In the light of 
existing multiple performance indicators, we try to compare the aspects that have 
been emphasized by each index. 
We limit the scope of our analysis to developing countries that are distinguished 
from developed nations by OECD membership for several reasons. First, it is 
essential to measure differences between government performance indices of simi-
lar samples, especially given that the more developed nations are now moving on 
to distribution policies while most developing countries are still focusing on 
increasing total wealth, which means that an indicator could be relevant to the gov-
ernment performance of developed nations but not to that of developing nations. 
Second, analyzing which organizational factors positively affect performance is of 
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special interest to developing countries because typically only the central govern-
ment of developing countries possesses the administrative power to implement 
development policies (Im, 2017). Moreover, the government performance in a 
developing country has a more direct impact on society than it does in a developed 
nation (Im, 2017).
 
Five Critical Determinants of Government Performance
A number of scholars have shed light on what allows how groups to secure bet-
ter organizational performance (Likert, 1967). Sangmook Kim, quoting Mark 
Popovich, argues that high-performing governments, like other organizations, con-
sist in “groups of employees who produce desired goods or services at higher qual-
ity with the same or fewer resources” (2004, p.245). Yet the impact of individu-
al-level variables on government performance has not been acknowledged with the 
exception of a few studies (Kim, 2004; Ritz, 2009; Petrovsky & Ritz, 2014). The 
focus of the literature on institutional variables and their relationship to govern-
ment performance makes sense in light of the fact that one of academia’s duties is 
to provide operable policy recommendations. Notwithstanding that, however, this 
one-sided and output-oriented approach that does not take public employees’ atti-
tudes into account has been criticized (Ritz, 2009). It should be noted that govern-
ments, like other organizations, need workers who are competitive, committed, 
motivated, and not corrupt to enhance performance or to successfully implement 
human resource management tools that can improve performance. Hence, we 
employ five critical determinants observed at the individual level but known to 
contribute to organizational performance: trait competitiveness, change-oriented 
organizational citizenship behavior, public service motivation, organizational iden-
tification, and corruption tolerance. 
Trait Competitiveness 
Some people love competition and dive into it, while others try to avoid compe-
tition altogether. Whether competition motivates people or not largely correlates 
with the trait of competitiveness, which is stable over time and which a person 
tends to show in all areas of life (Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook et al., 2014; Mudrack, 
Bloodgood, & Turnley, 2012). Klein and Newby (2014) break trait competitiveness 
down into four kinds: general competitiveness, dominance, competitive effectivity, 
and personal enhancement. 
The literature on trait competitiveness in particular is not that large yet, as the 
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term is relatively new. Earlier studies that the current literature on trait competitive-
ness draws on are grounded in similar concepts that were introduced by Norman 
Triplett in 1987, including a competitive instinct, a certain kind of mental attitude 
during performance, and an intense desire to win. Researchers have sought to 
determine multiple dimensions of competitiveness (Houston, Harris, McIntire et 
al., 2002; Klein & Newby, 2014). In contrast to early studies of trait competitive-
ness that emphasize an idea of competition that is based on a person comparing 
herself to others, recent work has proposed a new dimension of competitiveness in 
which person compares herself to herself (In, 2017; Choi, Jung, & Im, 2018). Per-
sonal development competitiveness focuses on a person’s self-satisfaction, a feel-
ing of fulfillment that a person experiences when he achieves the goals he set for 
himself. 
The relationship between trait competitiveness and organizational performance 
has not yet been determined. However, as trait competitiveness is defined as 
“desire to win” or “desire to perform well” (Franken & Brown, 1995, p.178) and 
“competing to win” or “competing to excel” (Hibbard & Buhrmester, 2010, p.413), 
it seems natural to connect these attributes to performance. A number of hypotheses 
have been proposed regarding the impact of trait competitiveness on variables 
related to organizational performance. For instance, it has been argued that it can 
affect job motivation in either a positive way (Epstein & Harackiewicz, 1992; 
Choi, Jung, & Im, 2018) or negative way (Deci, Schwartz, Sheinman et al., 1981; 
Vallerand, Gauvin, & Halliwell, 1986; Amabile, 1982). Personal development com-
petitiveness has also been reported to decrease corruption tolerance, while interper-
sonal competitiveness showed the opposite effect, although this effect was moder-
ated in a performance-oriented climate (Mudrack, Bloodgood, & Turnley, 2012; 
Choi, Jung, & Im, 2018).
Change-oriented Organizational Citizenship Behavior 
Change-oriented organizational citizenship behavior can be defined as “con-
structive, extra-role efforts by individual retail boundary-spanning employees to 
identify and implement organizationally functional changes with respect to work 
methods, policies, and procedures within the context of their jobs, stores, or organi-
zations” (Bettencourt, 2004, p. 165). Individual initiative is a distinctive aspect of 
the organizational change behavior model because the other aspects that make it 
up—helping, sportsmanship, organizational loyalty, compliance, civic virtue, 
self-development—emphasis more collaborative behavior (Podsakoff et al, 2000; 
Choi, 2007). Employees engaging in change-oriented citizenship behavior improve 
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organizational functioning by addressing inefficient working mechanisms (Camp-
bell & Im, 2016; Bettencourt, 2004; Morrison & Phelps, 1999), although such 
interventions might undermine current work processes and even establish interper-
sonal networks. A distinguishing feature of change-oriented citizenship behavior is 
its voluntariness, which it shares with other citizen behaviors; formal job descrip-
tions and official performance indicators hardly ever cover the behavior of employ-
ees driven by it. 
Despite the fact that the concept of change-oriented citizenship behavior has 
garnered considerable attention in business management, it has not been much dis-
cussed in public administration (Campbell, 2015; Campbell & Im, 2016). This can 
partly be explained by the fact that there are varying perspectives regarding the role 
of administration. In the traditional view that posits a dichotomy between politics 
and administration, the role of public administrative employees is limited to imple-
menting the politician’s will. But a different view of public sector employees 
emphasizes the value of change-oriented behavior in tackling major criticisms 
bureaucracy faces, including its buck-passing culture, red tape, and unbendable 
procedures. Change-oriented citizenship behavior may help public employees to 
exceed citizens’ expectations (Vigoda-Gabot & Beeri, 2012). 
With regard to government performance, change-oriented citizenship behavior 
can play a major role in both positive and negative ways. First, it can serve as a cat-
alyst for creatively transforming the bureaucratic structures of public organizations 
(Bernier & Hafsi, 2007). To elaborate, it encourages extra-role behavior by 
employees, who do not expect recognition or rewards, that leads to better perfor-
mance for the whole organization. However, it is also possible that by seeking to 
change the organizational status quo, change-oriented citizenship behavior may 
create controversy over which procedures are more correct and has the potential to 
cause some unnecessary confusion that might interfere with performance.
Public Service Motivation
Public service motivation can be understood as “an individual’s predisposition 
to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and 
organizations” (Perry & Wise, 1990, p. 368). The theory of public service motiva-
tion is based on three core assumptions; individuals with who are motivated this 
way seek membership in public organizations; in public organizations, such moti-
vation is positively related to performance; and members of organizations motivat-
ed in this way are less interested in monetary rewards than those who are not so 
motivated (Perry & Wise, 1990, pp. 370-371; Perry, 2011). This theory has import-
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ant practical implications regarding the limited utilitarian incentives of the private 
sector. In contrast to rational choice theories that assume that individuals are 
self-interested seekers, this theory proposes morally and socially motivated individ-
uals who are willing to engage in producing public goods without much remunera-
tion (Neumann & Ritz, 2015). 
People who are motivated by public service work tend to perform better in pub-
lic sector jobs that are characterized by higher task significance and higher social 
influence than are private sector jobs (Bellé, 2013). In other words, public service 
motivation can be a catalyst for transforming altruistic motives into prosocial 
behavior. However, empirical studies on the impact of such motivation on job per-
formance have shown conflicting results. Naff and Crum (1999), using nearly 
10,000 samples from U.S. federal employees’ data, find a significant relationship 
between public service motivation and self-reported individual-level performance. 
Drawing on the very same data, Alonso and Lewis (2001) used two merit measures 
to test the impact of public service motivation. Their results varied according to the 
year of the data the researchers used, which led them to conclude that the relation-
ship between public service motivation and performance is clearly not robust when 
one employs different measures of public service motivation or uses proxy mea-
sures of performance. In his study, Bright (2007) considers whether person-organi-
zation fit mediates the relationship between public service motivation and perfor-
mance, finding that public service motivation had no direct impact on performance 
but only contributed to person-organization fit. Kim (2004) finds that public ser-
vice motivation has a positive impact on organizational performance but that other 
individual factors such as job satisfaction, affective commitment, and organization-
al citizenship behavior showed stronger effects. In line with Kim’s study, Vandena-
beele (2009) also finds that Belgian civil servants with high public service motiva-
tion have better performance results. This relationship is also supported by the case 
of a Chinese public organization that used supervisor-rated performance data and 
employee-rated public service motivation to enhance performance (Miao, Schwarz, 
& Xu, 2018). Schott, Kleef, and Steen (2015) argue that these inconclusive find-
ings may partially result from the fact that differences driven by varying individual 
understandings of the meaning of the phrase “serving the public” have not been 
taken into account.
Organizational Identification
Organizational identification is a construct from social identity theory (Ashforth 
& Mael, 1989) and can be defined as the “perception of oneness with or belonging-
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ness to an organization” (Mael & Ashforth, 1992). Organizational identification 
makes individuals categorize themselves as members of their employing organiza-
tions and promotes positive responses to directions from higher-ups. Thus, mem-
bers with high organizational identification willingly invest more time in their 
organization. This produces organizations with strong human capital that have 
knowledge and skills, that exert effort, and that establish a cooperative mode of 
operation, which not only leads to better individual performances but also contrib-
utes to organizational success (Carmeli, Gilat, & Waldman, 2007). 
There is a vast amount of literature on organizational identification. The first 
detailed model was proposed by James March and Herbert Simon in 1958, and in 
recent decades, the concept has received a lot of attention (Ashforth & Mael, 
1989). While most studies focus on its role in bringing beneficial outcomes to orga-
nizations (Likert, 1967; Mael & Ashforth, 1992), a considerable number maintain 
that it has the opposite effect. For instance, Dutton and Dukerich (1991) find evi-
dence indicating that strong organizational identification leads to stress and depres-
sion among employees. Umphress, Bingham, and Mitchell (2010) reported that 
employees with high organizational identification may facilitate unethical behav-
iors within the organization. Brown (1969) shows that the relationship between 
organizational identification and group cohesiveness is negative, even his results 
are not statistically significant. 
Although the literature generally suggests that the impact of organizational 
identification on organizational performance is positive, recent studies point out a 
possible link between it and lower performance. Specifically, organizational identi-
fication may be helpful when it comes to routine and noncreative tasks but can 
become a hindrance to assignments that call for innovative thinking (Madjar, 
Greenberg, & Chen, 2011). Hekman, Steensma, Bigley, and Hereford (2016) argue 
that members with strong organizational identification tend to closely follow orga-
nizational protocol, which might harm performance when a task calls for more cre-
ativity. Veltrop, Molleman, Hooghiemstra, and van Ees (2016) discuss how organi-
zational identification moderates the relationship between tenure and task involve-
ment in a negative way.
Corruption Tolerance
A corrupt act in a public organization refers to an undesirable use of power by 
public employees who receive a benefit from the exercise of such power in both 
direct and indirect ways (Im, 2018a). In this article, corruption tolerance is defined 
as public employees’ perception of the acceptable extent of government corruption. 
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As government corruption is known to interfere with the equitable distribution of 
resources, prevalent corruption may ultimately hinder national competitiveness 
(Sandholz & Koetzle, 2000). 
Even though corruption generally impedes performance, since one’s self-inter-
est is often at odds with organizational goals, a number of researchers suggest that 
corruption may contribute to “greasing the wheel” (Huntington, 1968) in the gov-
ernments of developing countries, facilitating bureaucratic efficiency by allowing 
administrators to evade red tape. For example, when regulations are not optimal or 
are inefficient, corruption may function as a deregulating mechanism. Also, a cor-
ruption culture may enhance efficiency in developing countries because bureau-
crats in such a culture are likely to be subject to bribes, so-called voluntary taxes 
(Blackburn & Forgues-Puccio, 2007). Yet most scholars consider corruption to be 
one of the most important obstacles to development, arguing that the alleged bene-
fit of corruption is the exception rather than the rule. 
METHOD AND ANALYSIS
Data
We collected our data on public employee’s attributes and behaviors from the 
2017 Government Competitiveness Global Survey, which was conducted by the 
Government Competitiveness Center, located in Graduate School of Public Admin-
istration at Seoul University. The survey posed questions intended to explore public 
employees’ perceptions regarding various organization behavioral factors including 
trait competition, change-oriented citizenship behavior, public service motivation, 
organizational identification, and corruption tolerance (see the appendix for specif-
ics). We adopted a snowball sampling approach for the survey, which was distribut-
ed via e-mail. Participants were asked to recommend other appropriate public 
employees to join the survey. We expected this method to be helpful in encouraging 
public employees from developing countries, who would be less likely to partici-
pate if they thought their answers would be considered official. In addition, we 
contacted 50 embassies and 4 consulates in South Korea, from which we obtaining 
3 samples. The survey was translated into 13 languages, including the United 
Nation’s official languages, so as to make it convenient for participants and thereby 
enhancing the credibility of the results. The final sample size of public servants 
was 482, covering 51 developing countries out of 62 countries that had been con-
tacted. The characteristics of the participants are described in table 1 and the num-
Comparing Government Performance Indicators  11
Korean Journal of Policy Studies
ber of participants from each country is listed in table 5 along with fuzzy member-
ship scores for three outcome variables.
Despite some countries having only a few participants, we decided to analyze 
these cases anyway given that only very few global data sources provide percep-
tions of public employees from developing countries. Further, the worldwide sur-
veys that have been conducted like those by the Quality of Government Institute 
collect their samples from a limited number of reliable experts. We use average 
scores to transform the unit from an individual-level variable to a country-level 
variable, as that is the method widely adopted by many international surveys, 
including the World Values Survey and the World Happiness Report. All determi-
nants went through factor analysis that was loaded for one single factor each. 
Table 1. Characteristics of Respondents
Gender Job Position Level
Female 175 (36.3%) Upper 42 (8.7%)
Male 307 (63.7%) Middle-high 133 (27.6%)
Region Middle 258 (53.5%)
Africa 59 (12.2%) Entry 49 (10.2%)
Asia 146 (30.3%) Age 
Europe 91 (18.9%) 18-29 95 (19.7%)
Middle East Asia & North Africa 67 (13.9%) 30-39 196 (40.7%)
South America 119 (24.7%) 40-49 111 (23.0%)
50 or older 80 (16.6%)
Total Observations 482 (100%)
We used performance data from three indices: the World Bank Group’s World-
wide Governance Indicators, the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
Index, and the Government Competitiveness Center’s Government Competitive-
ness Index. Although other institutions like Quality of Government Institute and the 
World Justice Project provide robust indices, that assess concepts similar to that of 
government performance, we excluded these indices on the grounds that neither 
quality of government nor the rule of law measure effectiveness, efficiency, or 
competitiveness. Also we do not consider the International Institute for Manage-
ment Development’s Government Efficiency Index even though it pertains to what 
we study here because its definition of competitiveness is similar to that of World 
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Economic Forum, but the World Economic Forum’s index covers over 140 coun-
tries while the International Institute for Management Development only covers 60 
countries (International Institute for Management Development, 2014). We use 
sub-indicators derived from the indices of the aforementioned three institutions, 
which are government effectiveness, government efficiency, and throughput, 
respectively. The three indices overlap one another in certain respects, but each 
indicator can be discretely identified. Officially published major items for each 
indicator are shown in table 2 and the descriptive statistics of all variables can be 
found in table 3.1 





Adaptability of government policy to changes in the economy is high
The Public Service is not independent from political interference 
Government decisions are effectively implemented 
Bureaucracy does not hinder business activity 
The distribution infrastructure of goods and services is generally efficient 




Wastefulness of government spending 
Burden of government regulation 
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes 
Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations 




public officer’s capacity, leadership, leader’s commitment to achieving 
policy goals
Financial capacity 
financial independence, efficiency of resource allocation, management 
of tax evasion
Institutional capacity 
making rules and acts, level of decentralization, e-government, policy 
establishment and execution
 1. Descriptions of major items are limited because not every single measure is publicly accessible.
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Mean 4.17 4.33 4.22 4.18 2.66 0.37 3.43 0.5
S.D. 0.53 0.71 0.66 0.57 0.68 0.13 0.7 0.08
Range 2.80-5.01 2.90-5.50 2.88-5.80 3.11-5.21 1.68-4.00 0.08-0.63 1.49-5.56 0.34-0.69
* Citizen-oriented Organizational Behavior, **Public Service Motivation, ***Organizational Identification 
Methods 
To test how our five determinants affect government performance, we utilized 
fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, an increasingly popular set-theoretic 
strategy that researchers in various fields have started to use (Ragin, 1987; 2000). 
This method is distinguished from general quantitative analysis by the fact that it 
employs traditional Boolean logic to determine the complex causality of set of vari-
ables rather than estimating the net effects of single variables (Longest & Vaisey, 
2008). At the same time, it answers the common criticism that qualitative analysis 
is subjective because it uses numeric scores in its analysis. This method is particu-
larly suitable for analyzing the complex causality of a set of variables in analyses 
with a small number of cases. 
In our study, the use of fuzzy-set qualitative analysis is appropriate for three rea-
sons. First, the number of observations in our dataset is limited. The method 
requires the researcher to drop observations with missing data to avoid misinterpre-
tation (Ragin, 2009), so our first step was to do that, which meant we were left with 
even a smaller number of cases. Although fuzzy-set analysis is relatively generous 
when it comes to sample size compared to other methods, we found that our three 
datasets were extremely unbalanced with regard to single-year data. Thus, we 
decided to deal with the problem of missing data by using average scores of data of 
each indicator for the period 2016-18 rather than by imputing a group mean, based 
on the assumption that government performance in the short term will retain certain 
characteristic features (Jung, 2003). We conducted a fuzzy-set qualitative analysis 
of 18 cases for government effectiveness, 49 cases for government efficiency and 
50 cases for throughput (see table 5). Second, we tried to determine which combi-
nations of certain individual’s attributes and organizational behavior contributed to 
better government performance. In our analysis of the three indices, we aimed to 
identify not only which factors contribute to government performance but also 
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which factors receive more emphasis in each indicator. Third, although hard mea-
sures are most often used with fuzzy-set analyses, social science researchers have 
sometimes used soft measures with them, including government roles and perfor-
mance (Kim & Park, 2013), quality of democracy (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002), 
accessibility to unemployment benefits (Kvist, 2007), and executive-legislative 
relations (Im, 2018b).
The process of fuzzy-set qualitative analysis is as follows. First, the outcome 
variable is constructed via fuzzy-set calibration. Calibration refers to dividing the 
governments of countries into groups and assigning a fuzzy-set value that ranges 
from full membership (1) to nonmembership (0). This membership score reflects 
the degree to which a government is in or out of a set (Ragin, 2009). After calibra-
tion, any case that has a threshold value (0.5) is excluded from the final analysis 
because it is neither in nor out of sets. We first normalized government effective-
ness, government efficiency and throughput and then calibrated them with the 
threshold value of 0.5 (Paykani, Rafiey, & Sajjadi, 2018). We set fully-in cases to 
have a value exceeding 0.95 and set fully-out cases to have value less than 0.05 
(Ragin, 2000). Fuzzy membership scores of countries for each indicator can be 
found in table 5. Second, we applied the same method to our five variables. We 
chose a threshold value of 0.5 because there are not many theories regarding how 
to decide the exact standard for these variables. We therefore defined two fuzzy-
sets for each variable, governments with strongly public-service-motivated 
employees and governments with weakly public-service-motivated employees, for 
instance. We then calculated the fuzzy score for each government, a value that rep-
resents its partial membership to the set. Finally, with these calibrated variables, we 
constructed the truth table that illustrates which configuration of antecedent condi-
tions each case meets (Fiss, 2011). Since we have five possible antecedents, our 
truth table has 32 rows (i.e., 2^5), which represent all possible combinations. By 
reducing the number of rows in the table with an algorithm using Boolean algebra, 
we determined which combinations of factors are considered sufficient to explain 
the outcome score of the three indices. We used the STATA 13 program to perform 
the whole process.
Empirical Results
In the following we briefly explain what fuzzy-set outcome scores are as well as 
the results with regard to necessary and sufficient conditions. There are two types 
of measurements to test the explanatory power of set relations: set-theoretic consis-
tency and set-theoretic coverage. The consistency score represents the degree to 
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which cases sharing antecedent conditions show the same outcome. The generally 
accepted level of consistency for the test of necessity is 0.9 (Schneider, Schul-
ze-Bentrop, Paunescu, 2010). On the other hand, an acceptable consistency score 
for a sufficient condition is 0.75 or 0.8 (Ragin, 2009). The coverage value reflects 
the empirical relevance of a solution. Given that there may be multiple paths to an 
outcome variable, a coverage value can be low despite a high consistency score. 
There are three kinds of coverage: raw, unique, and solution. The solution coverage 
refers to the total coverage of all the sufficient conditions of an outcome. Raw cov-
erage refers to each term of the solution, while unique coverage means each indi-
vidual solution. 
First, we respectively test the necessary conditions for the fuzzy sets of govern-
ments with high performance scores in government effectiveness, government effi-
ciency, and throughput. As can be seen in table 4, none of the conditions meet this 
standard. Yet four attribution factors— competitiveness, change-oriented citizen-
ship behavior, public service motivation and organization identification—show 
high consistency scores (the average score being around 0.75), while scores of cor-
ruption tolerance are relatively low.
Table 4. Analysis of Necessary Conditions
Trait 






0.855 0.847 0.872 0.837 0.598
Government 
Efficiency (GCI) 0.700 0.679 0.682 0.680 0.665
Throughput (GC) 0.806 0.750 0.742 0.728 0.561
Average 0.787 0.758 0.765 0.748 0.608
* Citizen-oriented Organizational Behavior, **Public Service Motivation, ***Organizational Identification 
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Albania 4 0.638 0.551
Argentina 20 0.021 0.449
Bahrain 12 0.957 0.796
Bangladesh 4 0.213 0.082
Belarus 6 0.306
Bolivia 4 0.319 0.184
Brazil 23 0.059 0.064 0.837
Bulgaria 9 0.412 0.255 0.898
Cameroon 3 0.532 0.102
China 20 0.941 0.894 0.857
Colombia 20 0.294 0.277 0.714
Costa Rica 7 0.553 0.959
Croatia 11 0.118 0.043 0.918
Dominican 
Republic 7 0.340 0.286
Ecuador 3 0.170 0.571
Egypt 6 0.383 0.224
Ethiopia 3 0.468 0.122
Georgia 9 0.872 0.878
India 20 0.588 0.851 0.633
Indonesia 22 0.647 0.830 0.429
Jordan 5 0.706 0.936 0.612
Kazakhstan 3 0.882 0.766 0.408
Kenya 5 0.723 0.367
Kuwait 15 0.511 0.490
Lebanon 5 0.085 0.000
Liberia 5 0.745 0.531
Lithuania 14 0.824 0.447 1.000
Morocco 3 0.660 0.694
Nigeria 3 0.234 0.061
Pakistan 3 0.298 0.041
Paraguay 5 0.191 0.245
Peru 20 0.353 0.149 0.592
Philippines 23 0.471 0.426 0.510
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Qatar 15 1.000 1.000 0.980
Russian 
Federation 20 0.529 0.362 0.673
Rwanda 5 0.979 0.816
Senegal 3 0.787 0.347
Servia 5 0.106 0.388
South Africa 22 0.176 0.915 0.755
Sri Lanka 4 0.702 0.776
Tanzania 3 0.617 0.143
Thailand 23 0.765 0.489 0.735
Tunisia 6 0.574 0.469
Uganda 3 0.596 0.163
Ukraine 13 0.235 0.128 0.265
Uruguay 7 0.681 0.939
Uzbekistan 3 0.204
Venezuela 3 0.000 0.000 0.020
Vietnam 21 0.404 0.653
Zambia 3 0.809 0.327
For the next step, we explored which set of sufficient conditions lead governments 
to receive a higher score for each indicator. Full circles (●) indicate the presence of a 
condition (i.e., governments that fall into a set with high public service motivation) 
and empty circles (◯) indicate the absence of it (i.e. governments fall into a set with 
low public service motivation). Blank cells indicate ambiguous conditions. We set the 
consistency value at 0.75 to test configurations of sufficient conditions. Table 6 
shows varying results for our five possible variables depending on each indicator. 
This proves our point that each government performance indicator has different suffi-
cient conditions under which a given country can secure a higher score. 
Government effectiveness has two sets of sufficient conditions to which all five 
variables contribute. Lower trait competitiveness and lower corruption tolerance 
with higher change-oriented citizenship behavior, higher public service motivation, 
higher organizational identification are likely to lead to better performance. In the 
second configuration, the role of trait competitiveness replaces that of change-ori-
ented citizenship behavior. Corruption tolerance plays a negative role in both set 
relations, while public service motivation and organizational identification con-
stantly show the opposite effect. At the same time, the results regarding the roles of 
trait competitiveness and change-oriented citizenship behavior are not conclusive. 
The consistency score is set over 0.8 for both cases and the total solution consisten-
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cy is over 0.9. The total coverage is less than 0.5. 
Government efficiency also has two configurations with sufficient conditions. The 
first configuration is very similar to that of government effectiveness except for the 
ambiguous role of public service motivation. In the second configuration, it is notable 
that higher corruption tolerance combined with higher trait competitiveness, higher 
public service motivation, and higher organizational identification can lead to higher 
performance. As discussed in the literature review, corruption tolerance is believed to 
have positive effects on economic advancement in the developing countries under 
certain conditions. It should be noted that the unique coverage of the second configu-
ration is almost two times higher than that of the first one. The consistency scores are 
over 0.8 for both set combinations. The total coverage and solution consistency are at 
the same level as those of government effectiveness. 
Table 6. Sufficient Configurations of Antecedent Conditions for Government Performance 
Indicator












◯ ● ● ● ◯ 0.355 0.039 0.893
● ◯ ● ● ◯ 0.401 0.084 0.904





● ◯ ● ◯ 0.345 0.061 0.868





● ◯ ◯ 0.427 0.002 0.893
● ◯ 0.439 0.007 0.868
● 0.806 0.339 0.806
Total coverage: 0.821
Solution consistency: 0.786
* Citizen-oriented Organizational Behavior, **Public Service Motivation, ***Organizational Identification
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Throughput has three configurations of sufficient conditions that are much sim-
pler compared that of government efficiency and government effectiveness. Higher 
public service motivation combined with lower organizational identification and 
lower corruption tolerance are sufficient conditions for better performance. Addition-
ally, higher change-oriented citizenship behavior with lower organizational identifi-
cation can lead to a higher throughput score. The role of organizational identification, 
we might point out, differs from other indicators. In our third configuration, higher 
competitiveness by itself has a raw coverage value of 0.806, which is even higher 
than the total coverage of other indicators. However, the combination of the presence 
of public service motivation and the absence of organizational identification and cor-
ruption tolerance show a higher consistency than competitiveness as a sole determi-
nant. The total coverage is almost double that of other indicators whereas solution 
consistency is the lowest. 
 CONCLUSION
Governments of developing countries rely on performance indicators produced 
by several global institutions to assess their status and to decide how and where to 
invest their limited resources. Understanding the different determinants of various 
performance indicators would help governments to better manage their resource 
distribution. Framing public employees’ attributional and behavior factors as suffi-
cient conditions is also helpful, as one of the most important performance strategies 
concerns how to manage human resources in public organizations. 
This study investigates the relationship between three well-known performance 
indicators (government effectiveness, government efficiency, and throughput) and 
five critical determinants (trait competitiveness, change-oriented citizenship behav-
ior, public service motivation, organization identification, and corruption tolerance) 
with the use of fuzzy-set qualitative analysis in order to find common determinants 
that enhance government performance and to explore the different sufficient condi-
tions of each of the government performance indicators. There are several interest-
ing findings of this research. 
First, higher public service motivation always positively contributes to the three 
government performance indicators. Public service motivation features in at least 
one causal recipe with respect to each performance indicator irrespective of the 
number of determinants. This supports Perry and Wise’s proposition that public 
service motivation is “positively related to performance” in public organizations 
(1990, p. 370). Despite conflicting results regarding the relationship between pub-
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lic service motivation and organizational performance in the literature, this finding 
suggests that public service motivation is the most constant sufficient condition to 
high national-level government performance scores. 
Second, the number of attributional factors that figure in the causal recipes var-
ies between the three performance indices. For instance, each of the five attribu-
tional factors make a contribution to the government effectiveness score. Nonethe-
less, throughput has the simplest sufficient condition sets, which feature trait com-
petitiveness as the sole determinant with raw coverage and a consistency score of 
0.806. The fact that throughput focuses on a government’s human and managerial 
capacity specifically, while the other two indices assess a government’s perfor-
mance in general, may account for this more parsimonious result. Also, it should be 
noted that Government Competitiveness Center has underlined the importance of 
this trait for years even though the results of the 2017 Government Competitive-
ness Global Survey are not included as subindicators yet. 
Third, combined with other factors, innovation-inclined attributional factors 
such as trait competitiveness and change-oriented citizenship behavior make a neg-
ative or inconclusive contribution to government effectiveness and government 
efficiency, but that is not the case for throughput. Trait competitiveness is associat-
ed with winning strategies and active engagement (In, 2017). Also, change-oriented 
citizenship behavior is known for encouraging innovation and for supporting cre-
ative organizations (Vigoda-Gabot & Beeri, 2012; Bernier & Hafsi, 2007). There-
fore, this deviation concerning the roles of innovation-inclined attributional factors 
in government effectiveness and government efficiency indicators can be partially 
explained by the fact of a perception that government should focus more on policy 
implementation rather than policy determination. Such a hypothesis is further sup-
ported by the findings for organization identification, a possible obstacle to higher 
performance in innovative organizations (Hekman et al., 2016), which shows a 
negative contribution only in throughput.
Finally, it is notable that only government efficiency generates sufficient config-
urations in cases in which corruption tolerance has a positive effect. The possibility 
that corruption may have a positive impact on economic development in develop-
ing countries under certain conditions may account for this result (Huntington, 
1968). Despite the well-accepted detrimental effects of corruption, some scholars 
argue that corruption may function as a deregulating mechanism as well as a source 
of “voluntary taxes,” motivating the infusion of human resources into the public 
sector. In this regard, a sufficient configuration that shows the positive role of cor-
ruption tolerance can be explained by the fact that the government efficiency indi-
cator puts a lot of emphasis on the economic aspect of performance while taking 
Comparing Government Performance Indicators  21
Korean Journal of Policy Studies
the managerial contexts of public organizations less into account (Han, 2014; Im et 
al., 2015). 
Our principal purpose here is to argue that government performance indicator 
share common ground but that each one also has a specific emphasis that makes it 
different from the other indices. Through comparison, we have found that govern-
ment effectiveness has the largest number of sufficient conditions in one causal rec-
ipe and that government efficiency emphasizes economic advancement, while 
throughput is more inclined to center on innovation and competitiveness than other 
indicators. Finally, public service motivation is one common ground that all three 
indicators have as a sufficient condition in their causal recipe. 
The limitations of this study are as follows. First, even though the use of the 
average score is a popular method, it may distort results concerning the unit of 
analysis. Also, we consider five determinants altogether as they are widely dis-
cussed contributors to organizational performance, but many researchers determine 
each of them in different model stages. Yet it is one advantage of fuzzy-set qualita-
tive analysis that the effects of explaining variables are estimated using a simpler 
process. Lastly, fuzzy-set qualitative analysis has an analytical benefit in explaining 
sets of variables in way that produces pathways to the outcome. Therefore, some 
may find our interpretation of individual factors less convincing. Future research 
should attempt to obtain datasets collected at organizational level that can be used 
to construct more sophisticated behavioral models and to further investigate the 
in-between relationship of explaining variables in one causal recipe.
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APPENDIX: MEASURES FOR ANTECEDENTS
Items*
Competitiveness 
When in a competition, I would like to win because that means I 
performed better than other people.
When I am competing for an award or a promotion, I mostly focus on my 
own qualifications, rather than comparing myself with other applicants or 
candidates.
During competitions, I tend to focus on how much better or worse the 
other candidates performed than myself.
It is more important for me to achieve excellence than to win others.





I try to change work processes to increase efficiency.
I try to make suggestions to improve daily operations of the organization.
I try to fix unnecessary or faulty procedures.




I feel very responsible for the society that I belong to.
I consider public service as my civic duty.
I think public service is more meaningful way of vocation than pursuing 
my own self-interest.
I willingly take my own losses to help others.
I think social contribution is more important than personal achievement.
Organizational 
Identification
When somebody criticizes my department, it feels like a personal insult 
(or, I feel bad).
My department’s successes are equivalent to my own successes.
Working in my department helps me understand who I am.
Corruption 
Tolerance 
It is acceptable that a central government official gives a job to someone 
from his family who does not have adequate qualifications.
It is acceptable that a central government official demands a favor or an 
additional payment for some service that is part of his job.
It is acceptable that a central government official decides to locate a 
development project in an area where his friends and supporters live.
*Items are measured in five point Likert Scale
